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DALLAS, DRED SCOTT AND EYRIE ERIE
Arthur John Keeffe*
Glen DeValerio* *
I. COMMON LAW OF CRIME
UST as it was not a crime against the federal government for
Charles J. Guiteau to kill James A. Garfield on July 2, 1881, at
the Washington, D.C. railroad station and Leon Czolgosz to kill
William McKinley on September 6, 1901,' in Buffalo, New York,
it was also not a federal crime for Lee Harvey Oswald to kill John
Fitzgerald Kennedy on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas; if
he did.
The reason for this is that there is no common law of crimes in
America and absent a federal statute making it one, Oswald's as-
sassination of John F. Kennedy was not a wrong against our federal
government.
A statute has at last been passed making it a federal crime in
the future to kill the President Of course, this statute (because it
is criminal and not civil legislation) would be unconstitutional
under the ex post facto clause were it given retroactive application."
The doctrine of no common law of federal crimes arose in United
States v. Hudson and Goodwin." It began when Dr. Azel Backus
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1 W. BENET, THE READER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA (Crowell 1948).
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AND ADMIN. NEWS 2866.
'Calder v. Bull, 1 U.S. (3 Dall.) 172 (1798).
4 2 U.S. (7 Cranch) 405 (1812).
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preached a sermon in Conneciticut against Thomas Jefferson for
the so-called Walker episode.' Jefferson was one of Walker's bride-
men and when Walker had to go into the woods for four months to
deal with the Indians at Fort Stanwix, he made the mistake of ask-
ing Mr. Jefferson to look after his wife and infant daughter. Jeffer-
son unsuccessfully propositioned the wife. But for his sermon, a
grand jury in Connecticut returned an indictment against Azel
Backus for criminal libel. In addition to Backus, criminal libel in-
dictments were also returned against Judge Tapping Reeve, founder
of the Litchfield Law School, Hudson and Goodwin as publishers
of the Hartford Currant, Thomas Collier, as publisher of the Moni-
tor and a young candidate for the ministry, Thaddeus Osgood-all
for criminally libeling Mister Jefferson.
Under the common law of libel the truth is no defense but the
Alien and Sedition Acts changed the common law to make it a
defense.!
In authorizing these Connecticut libel actions, however, Presi-
dent Jefferson did so on condition that the truth was to be a defense
because the Alien and Sedition Acts had been repealed' by the time
of the Hudson and Goodwin case in 1808. Thus, the validity of the
indictments depended upon whether the common law was a law of
the United States.
Although Azel Backus pleaded to go to trial so that he could
prove the truth of his sermon, Judge Pierpont Edwards, son of
Jonathan, insisted on the determination of the question of jurisdic-
tion.! On that question, he disagreed with the Circuit Justice Mr.
Justice Livingston and the question was certified to the Supreme
Court of the United States. When heard there, Crosskey tells us that
the four Jeffersonian Justices (Johnson, Livingston, Todd and
Duval) outvoted the three Federalists (Marshall, Story and Bushrod
Washington) to dismiss the indictments as being beyond the Court's
jurisdiction." Thus, it was wrongly established in 1812 that there is
12 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 772 (1953) [hereinafter
cited as CROSSKEY].
I I Stat. 596; Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163 (1808) and Common-
wealth v. Morris, I Va. Cas. 175 (1811).
7 CROSSKEY at 774.
8 Id. at 775.
Old. at 764-84.
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no common law of federal crime in America, not even when an
assassin kills our President.
This was but the first step of many to destroy the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of the United States, however, and prevent its
becoming what the Constitutional forefathers intended-the juri-
dical head of this nation.
II. COMMON LAW IN CIVIL CASES
Meanwhile, the federal courts continued to use federal common
law to decide civil cases. This use of the federal common law, of
course, dates from 1789 when the founding fathers provided in the
Constitution that "the judicial power of the United States shall be
vested in one Supreme Court" and that the judicial power shall
extend not only to cases presenting federal questions but also to
controversies between citizens of different states, between aliens and
citizens and to all cases of admiralty.'1
Alexander Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST explains why diversity
jurisdiction was created:
[T]he national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which
one state or its citizens are opposed to another state or its citizens.
To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all
evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should
be committed to that tribunal, which, having no local attachments,
will be likely to be impartial, between the different states and their
citizens, and which, owing its official existence to the union, will
never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the principles on
which it is founded."
This seems very clear that from the beginning the Constitution was
intended to give the federal courts independence from state statutes
and state decisions.
Article III1 when combined with the full faith and credit clause"'
and the supremacy clause" makes it clear that the Constitution in-
"U.S. CONST. art. Il, $ 1.
'lid. § 2.
2 THE FEDERALIST No. 30, at 588 (J. Hamilton ed. 1875) (A. Hamilton).
"U.S. CONST. art. III.
14 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
"U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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tends a single uniform system of nationwide rules of international
and interstate conflict of laws.
By the time of Swift v. Tyson,"0 however, the Supreme Court had
given up its right to ignore state statutes provided they were consti-
tutional as construed by the state's highest court.
Swift v. Tyson, was subject to bitter attacks at Harvard Law
School by John Chipman Gray, Charles Warren, Felix Frankfurter
and finally Louis Dembitz Brandeis, who gave it the coup de grace
in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins." In retrospect it is hard to under-
stand how these otherwise able graduates of Harvard Law School
could make such a mistake. The justice of Swift v. Tyson is un-
questionable-a decision by an extraordinarily able Harvard grad-
uate, Joseph Story.
Crooked Maine Yankees sold Tyson, a New Yorker, land in
Maine that he said was worthless. Tyson had accepted a 1500 dol-
lar bill of exchange, however, that Norton and Keith, the sellers of
the land, drew on him. Thereafter the Maine owners transferred the
bill to Swift who had indorsed a note of Norton and Keith and had
been obliged to pay it.
The argument developed that Swift could not be a holder in due
course because he did not pay cash but took the bill for a past con-
sideration, to reimburse Swift for having had to pay Norton and
Keith's note.
Story properly rejected this argument. A contrary decision would
have destroyed negotiability. If negotiable paper is to pass freely
from hand to hand, the decision in Swift v. Tyson must hold then
and now.
Thus, there is no merit in the Harvard party line of Gray, War-
ren, Frankfurter and Brandeis questioning their fellow Harvard
graduate's decision in Swift v. Tyson.
Moreover, when years later, the point came before New York's
highest court, Swift v. Tyson became the law of the State of New
York1 and Chancellor Kent's contrary decision in Coddington v.
Bay' was repudiated.
1641 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
17 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
"Kelso & Co. v. Ellis, 224 N.Y. 528, 121 N.E. 364 (1918).
195 Johns. Ch. 54 (N.Y. Ch. 1821), aff'd 20 Johns. 637 (N.Y. 1822).
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III. COMMON LAW AND DRED SCOTT
This was the state of things with respect to federal common law
when Dred Scott v. Sanford"0 was decided in 1856.
Dred Scott, known as "Sam," belonged to a U.S. Army physician,
Dr. Emerson, stationed at Jefferson Barracks in Missouri, then slave
territory under the Missouri Compromise. Dr. and Mrs. Emerson
were moved by the Army, first to Rock Island in Illinois, part of the
Northwest Territory and a free state and thereafter to Fort Snelling
in what was then the Wisconsin Territory and the northern part of
the Louisiana Purchase and free territory under the Missouri Com-
promise. They took "Sam" with them.
Either at Rock Island or Fort Snelling, however, they gave "Sam"
his name. It came from the threat to the military post of periodic
visits by the then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Winfield
Scott, who was a strict disciplinarian and a teetotaler. Hence came
"Dred Scott." It was cheap military humor at Sam's expense."
At Snelling, Dred Scott met Harriett after Dr. Emerson bought
her from a Major Taliafero. Dr. and Mrs. Emerson allowed him to
marry Harriett and subsequently "Eliza" was born to Dred and
Harriett on the Mississippi River boat Gipsy in the Wisconsin Terri-
tory. Later when the Emersons moved back to Jefferson Barracks
the Scott family went along and their second child, "Lizzie," was
born there.
Of the two suits Dred Scott brought for his freedom, the first was
against Mrs. Emerson in the Missouri state courts." There, the trial
judge decided in favor of Dred Scott but the Supreme Court of
Missouri reversed, two to one dissenting. That court held that de-
spite his going north into free territory Dred Scott and his family
were still Emerson slaves."
By that time, Dr. Emerson had died and his widow had remar-
ried Congressman Chafee and moved to Boston. In abolitionist
Boston, the Congressman could not own Dred Scott so Mrs. Emer-
son transferred him to her father, Dr. Sanford, who really did not
want him either.
Back in Missouri, Blow, a former owner, took charge of Dred
2060 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
11 W. LEwis, WrIoTU FEAR OR FAVOR 382 (1965).
1I Id. at 383.
2Id. at 383-84.
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Scott's fight for freedom and hired a fine law firm in St. Louis that
instituted the second suit in diversity of citizenship in the United
States District Court for Missouri," while the Missouri state judge
held the first suit in abeyance.
In the federal court, attorneys for Dr. Sanford (inaccurately
spelled Sandford) pleaded in abatement that there was no diversity
of citizenship and no jurisdiction because Dred Scott could not be a
citizen of the United States and residence at Rock Island or Fort
Snelling and marriage there could not deprive the Emersons of their
property, to wit, Dred Scott and his family.'
On this question Chief Justice Taney goes one way and Justice
Ben Curtis the other, but the point that is interesting is the effect
that the Court gives to the decision of the Supreme Court of
Missouri.
Justice Taney takes the position that the Supreme Court is bound
by the ruling of the highest court of Missouri, right or wrong, just
or unjust, wise or stupid."
Justice Ben Curtis said on the other hand:
In this case, it is to be determined what laws of the United States
were in operation in the Territory of Wisconsin, and what was their
effect on the status of the plaintiff. Could the plaintiff contract a
lawful marriage there? Does any law of the State of Missouri impair
the obligation of the contract of marriage, destroy his rights as a
husband, bastardize the issue of the marriage, and reduce them to
a state of slavery? '
And citing Swift v. Tyson, Justice Ben Curtis says:
Upon such a question, not depending on any statute or local usage,
but on principles of universal jurisprudence, this court has re-
peatedly asserted it could not hold itself bound by the decisions of
the State courts, however great respect might be felt for their learn-
ing, ability and impartiality."
This causes him to conclude:
Sitting here to administer the law between these parties, I do not
feel at liberty to surrender my own convictions of what the law
"Id. at 385-86.
5 Id.




requires, to the authority of the decision in 15 Missouri Reports."
In this result Justice Ben Curtis does not differ from any United
States District Judge known to the authors today. Sitting to do jus-
tice under the Constitution, no district judge is going to make an
unjust decision under the compulsion of a poor state decision. He is
a judge not a ventriloquist's dummy and in one way or another,
justice as the judge sees it will prevail in his court. Swift v. Tyson is,
therefore, as much the law of our federal courts today as it was in
1842. It just is not cited.
In other words, to chain the federal courts in this day and age to
decisions of state courts, right or wrong, turns the clock back to
Dred Scott.
IV. EYRIE ERIE
Yet this is precisely what happened in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.
It is Dred Scott reasoning.
In Erie the question was whether a railroad was liable in ordi-
nary negligence to a trespasser who used a longitudinal path along
its right of way. The railroad mowed down poor Tompkins with an
open freight door as he walked along this path.
The railroad's argument was the technical one. Tompkins as a
trespasser cannot recover without proof of gross negligence, what-
ever that is.
At the time of the decision in Erie and indeed the majority rule
in this country today is that a trespasser, such as Tompkins, has a
right under these circumstances to recover on proof of simple or
ordinary negligence."
How could there be a just result otherwise?
On the merits the decision in Erie is as unjust and wrong as
Chancellor Kent's decision in Coddington v. Bay."
This is why such defenders as Erie has, do not want to discuss
the justice or injustice of the Erie case on its facts.
Moreover, the reasons Mr. Justice Brandeis gives for his decision
are unsound: First, Brandeis contends there is no such thing as
21 Id. at 604.
"W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 360 (4th ed. 1971); see generally Southern
Ry. Co. v. Campbell, 309 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 366 (1965).
"See note 19 supra.
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Federal Common Law; second, that an hitherto undiscovered draft
of the Rules of Decision Act establishes that the draftsman, Chief
Justice Oliver Ellsworth, intended by use of the word "laws" to
bind our federal courts not only to statutes as Mr. Justice Story had
held but to decisions of the state courts as well;"3 third, that, while
the Rules of Decision Act itself is not unconstitutional, in some way
Justice Brandeis does not explain that the judicial construction
Story gives to the Act is;" and, finally, fourth, experience of the
federal courts under Swift v. Tyson between 1842 and 1938 demon-
strates that Swift v. Tyson is wrong.'
A. No Federal Common Law
No less a person than Mr. Justice Robert Jackson knocks this
point of Justice Brandeis into cocked hat by saying:
I do not understand Justice Brandeis' statement in Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins that 'There is no Federal general common law,' to
deny that the common law may in proper cases be an aid to or
the basis of a decision of Federal questions. In its context it means
to me only that Federal Courts may not apply their own notions of
the common law at variance with applicable state decisions except
'where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States so
require or provide.' Indeed, in a case decided on the same day as
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, Justice Brandeis said that 'whether the
water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two
States is a question of 'Federal common law upon which neither
the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive'.
Were we bereft of the common law, our Federal system would
be impotent.'
By the transparent device of calling the D'Oench, Duhme and
Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation case" a federal ques-
tion case, the Court there uses federal common law to hold, just as
Justice Story did in Swift v. Tyson, that the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation became a bona fide holder in due course of a
promissory note given it by a Missouri bank that, when taking it
3"Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
"Id.; Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
178V, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923).
4 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3Id. at 78-80.
" D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447, 469-70 (1942).
37 Id.
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from the borrower, had agreed with him not to enforce it. The
Missouri state courts would have honored the agreement just as the
New York state courts in Swift v. Tyson.
It is nonsense, therefore, to attempt to argue that the Erie rule is
confined to diversity of citizenship cases. If the rule has any merit
it is equally applicable to federal question and diversity cases. In
both instances federal common law is used and state common law
to the contrary is rejected. Even a staunch defender of Justice Bran-
deis, such as Judge Henry Friendly, concedes this."
Why should federal common law apply to the United States but
not to private litigants? The answer, of course, is that in using fed-
eral common law when the United States holds the note instead of
the little Missouri bank, the Court is applying the most despicable
rule of law of all-sovereign immunity, the King can do no wrong.
Moreover it is being used in a flagrantly discriminatory way, the
Court is saying that if the Missouri bank were the litigant, the Mis-
souri state law would be followed but Uncle Sam is above the law.
How unjust and dishonest!
Today the federal common law, which Justice Brandeis says does
not exist, is used and applied by the federal courts when the govern-
ment holds a government bond," in labor cases,"' bankruptcy cases '
and in cases involving both government prime and subcontracts.'
More recently, at the October 1972 Term, the Supreme Court in
Illinois v. Milwaukee"3 has unanimously held that claims with re-
spect to the pollution of navigable waters "[w]ill support claims
founded upon federal common law."
B. Ellsworth's Draft
Without question the principal cause for Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomp-
kins was the discovery by Harvard Professor Charles Warren of a
38 Friendly, In Praise of Erie--and of The New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964).
8Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
'Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
,' Corn Exch. Nat. Bank v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
4 United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
4- 406 U.S. 91 (1972); see contra, Josephson, The Invalid Growth of the New
Federal Common Law Dictates the Need for a Second Erie, 9 HoUSTON L. REV..
329 (1971).
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prior draft of section 34 of the original Judiciary Act of 1789."
This draft read as follows:
And be it further enacted, that the statute law of the several States
in force for the time being and their unwritten or common law now
in use, whether by adoption from the common law of England, the
ancient statutes of the same or otherwise, except where the Consti-
tution, Treaties or Statutes of the United States shall otherwise re-
quire or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decisions in trials at
common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they
apply. (Emphasis supplied)'
In a brillant analysis of this draft Professor William Crosskey
establishes that while Professor Warren made a contribution with
the discovery of the draft, he did not know how to read it.'
First, Professor Crosskey agrees that Professor Warren is correct
in believing that when the explicit reference to unwritten law, un-
derscored above, was stricken from this draft and the word "laws"
substituted that the change was stylistic only and "laws" was meant
to include both statutory and decisional law."'
But second, Professor Crosskey calls sharp attention to the use of
the word "now" in the draft and argues unanswerably that the
words "now in use" were intended to confine the application of
state law in federal courts to the time, namely 1789. This means,
says Professor Crosskey, that "[s]tate-court innovations made in
the common law, if made after 1789," were not to be 'regarded as
rules of decision' by the national courts, as the section was orig-
inally drafted. .. .
And third, the reference at the end of the draft to the Constitu-
tion, the Treaties and Statutes of the United States and also to "in
trials at common law" and "in cases where they apply" meant that
not only was the statute to be limited to "trials at common law" but
that the test for the propriety of the application also be "the law of
'Warren, supra note 33.
4Id.
46 See note 5 supra at 627-34; see generally Crosskey at 865-68, 912-37, 1365.
4
1See CRossKEY at 868; Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972),
wherein Douglas, J., also agrees to the federal common law's being a part of sec-
tion 1331(a) of Title 28.
48 See CRossKEY at 867.
40 Id.
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nations"-chiefly the general commercial law and what is known
as "the conflict of laws." 0
Significantly, writing in reply to an article written in this JOURNAL
in 1963, 5" United States Circuit Judge Henry J. Friendly concedes:
Professor Crosskey is persuasive that the unearthing of Ellsworth's
original draft of section 34 tended to confirm Story's interpretation
more than to refute it.
52
And he adds that:
Warren's conclusion could thus be reached only by an argument,
contrary to the one he made, that the change from the original draft
was not simply stylistic but had a substantive purpose as well."
In other words the validity of Professor Crosskey's argument that
Professor Warren misread Ellsworth's draft is accepted by Judge
Friendly, who, when speaking in a counsel of despair, says that
nothing can be done about it. ' Why not? Has Judge Friendly lost
his zest for justice?
There is no statute of limitations in this land that protects injus-
tice and changes the character the founding fathers intended to give
the federal courts of this country when drafting the Constitution for
the protection of all. There is no reason to follow Judge Friendly's
counsel of despair.
Moreover, there is a civil liberty issue here. Justice Pierce Butler,
joined by the much maligned Justice McReynolds, asks in his dis-
sent that the case be reargued as to the proper reading of the Ells-
worth draft before the decision in Erie be made.' The majority re-
fuses the request for reargument even though on the oral arguments
and in the written briefs neither counsel had asked that Swift v.
Tyson be overruled."
This is but another instance when the Court decides a case on a
point not briefed or argued to the sorrow of the country. While
50 Id.
" Keeffe, Piercing Pearson, 29 J. Am L. & COM. 95 (1963).
2 See note 38 supra, at 5-6.
53 Id.
See note 38 supra.
55 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 88-89 (1938).
5o See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Brandeis, J.,
speaking for the majority never mentions this but Butler, J., in the dissent points
it out. Id. at 82.
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these instances have been few, almost every one has led to a funda-
mentally bad result."'
C. Is Swift v. Tyson Unconstitutional?
Judge Henry Friendly in his Cardozo lecture" does attempt to
argue that Justice Brandeis was right in deciding that Story's deci-
sion was an unconstitutional one but his position does not make
sense.
Justice Brandeis wanted to hold section 34 unconstitutional but
if he had Stone's vote would have been lost." Consequently,
Brandeis said:
If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we
should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied
throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the
course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so."
Article III of the Constitution vests judicial power in the United
States courts in federal question, diversity and admiralty cases,61 and
the choosing of applicable law by the courts in international and
interstate cases does not seem at all unreasonable. Certainly it can-
not be unconstitutional. The opinion of the Chief Justice at the
October 1972 Term in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company"
is a step in the right direction.
Of course, as Judge Friendly says," the federal courts would do
well to exercise their jurisdiction with reference to their constitu-
tional powers but this cannot mean that the Constitution requires
them in cases in which they have jurisdiction to follow blindly the
decisional law of any state whether right or wrong. Is Dred Scott
still the law of the land?
This is why this phase of the Brandeis opinion has been called its
"Achilles heel."6
"
7See, e.g., United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957).
"'See note 38 supra.
" A. MASON, HARLAND FisKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAw 479 (1956).
"Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 (1938).
6, U.S. CONST. art. III.
62407 U.S. 1 (1972).
6 See note 38 supra.
"McCormich and Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal
Courts, 33 ILL. L. REV. 126, 134 (1938).
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
D. Experience Under Swift v. Tyson Was Bad?
Of all the arguments in the Brandeis opinion, this is probably the
worst. It comes from an atrocious law review article written by
Felix Frankfurter, when still a Harvard Law School Professor.'
The cases cited in both Justice Brandeis' opinion and Professor
Frankfurter's article, do not support their conclusions."' (Similar
experience in analyzing the cases an opponent cites is not unusual.)
Accordingly, the authors of Weary Erie felt obliged to say that Pro-
fessor Frankfurter's contentions were "buttressed by evidence, frag-
mentary and misleading"'7 and that, quite to the contrary, Swift v.
Tyson "did promote uniformity to a substantial degree-not that
its effect was immediate but that it exerted a subtle, albeit inexor-
able, pressure upon the state court to march in harmony with its
fellows.""'
This analysis of experience under Swift v. Tyson corroborates
the prior research of Professors Yntema and Jaffin." Significantly,
Judge Friendly does not question the soundness of this contention
nor the Yntema-Jaffin research."0
For each of these four reasons, it is, therefore, the authors' firm
belief that Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins was wrongly decided and that
if the Supreme Court will take the question, it will be overruled.
Stranger things have happened.
Needless to say the Supreme Court should take the question in
the name of civil liberty alone because it is evident that it erred in
relying on Ellsworth's draft and it was arbitrary and capricious for
the Court of Brandeis and Stone to refuse Mr. Justice Butler's re-
quest that the case be set down for reargument.
With America and the world every day brought closer together
by the airplane there is no more important question for the Supreme
Court of the United States than what law its courts must apply in
international and interstate cases. It is a problem of highest priority.
11 Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and
State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928).
"Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494 (1949).
I71d. at 504.
I8 id.
09 Yntema and Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U.
PENN. L. REv. 869 (1931).
70 See generally note 38 supra.
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V. THE EXCESSES OF ERIE
Of course, Erie is today pressed to ridiculous lengths.
First, it has been held that the law that a federal court sitting
in diversity must follow is the law of the forum.' This codifies
"forum shopping" that Erie was to eliminate.
Second, in two indefensible cases it has been held that the law
of the state is to be determined, in the absence of a decision by the
highest court, by a decision of the lowest court in the state that may
not even be binding on any other court in the state."
Third, in the face of the express language in section 34 confining
rules of decision to "trials at common law," the rule was wrongly
extended to federal equity."
Fourth, the Erie rule in Reagan v. Merchants Transfer and
Warehouse Co." was pressed into procedure-how a federal court
serves process. Hopefully, however, Ragan is no longer law in view
of the contrary decision by the Supreme Court in Hannah v.
Plummer.'"
Fifth, even in federal question cases Erie has been improperly
applied. For instance, although federal law is applicable when a
Federal Reserve Bank sues on a government bond" it does not
apply when a private bank sues on the same bond" nor when the
Small Business Administration sues in Texas."8
VI. SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION SINCE ERIE
The Supreme Court of the United States in the last decade has
seldom taken certiorari in a diversity airplane case." Moreover,
72 Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
72 Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940), rehearing granted
313 U.S. 550, rehearing denied, 314 U.S. 709 (1941); cf. Thacher v. Trenton
Trust Co., 119 N.J. Eq. 408, 182 A. 912 (1936); Travers v. Reid, 119 N.J. Eq.
416, 182 A. 908 (1936); Hickey v. Kahl, 129 N.J. Eq. 233, 19 A.2d 33 (1941).
See generally CROSSKEY 923, 926-27.
7"Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
74337 U.S. 530 (1949).
75380 U.S. 460 (1965); but compare Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949), Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), and Woods v.
Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949), all of which are still on the books.
71 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
', Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Savings v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
71 United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
' Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); Richards v. United States,
369 U.S. 1 (1962).
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since Erie, it has been next to impossible to get the Supreme Court
of the United States to take jurisdiction in any diversity case. Indeed
it is easier for a thrice convicted felon to have his case reviewed in
the Supreme Court of the United States ° than for a private litigant
to have his diversity case reviewed by the high Court.
Any lawyer who specializes in Supreme Court practice and who
files a petition for certiorari in a diversity case will be pessimistic
about the chances for success but he will file only as he would in
a criminal case, when his fee is paid in cash in advance on the barrel
head. Accordingly it is hard to overestimate the damage that this
policy of the Supreme Court has done to the development of Ameri-
can private law, especially in the field of choice of law.
Undoubtedly, the greatest victim of this policy is the Court itself.
It has become a court of police and administrative law and has lost
prestige. For every point of private law it decides, there are 10,000
points of public law. It is no longer the court of the people that our
constitutional forefathers intended it to be. Instead it is one for
policemen and administrators to the exclusion of lawsuits between
plain people. It is not that cases involving policemen and adminis-
trators do not deserve to be heard. Nor, indeed, that the Court has
not been doing a good job in disposing of them. Rather these cases
occupy the Supreme Court full time and by refusing to hear diver-
sity cases the Court never reviews the cases that occupy seventy-five
per cent of the time of American lawyers.
Consequently, by its black ball of diversity cases, the Court gives
itself, wittingly or unwittingly, a bad public image and reduces its
own constitutional jurisdiction.
It does this as effectively today as Thad Stevens did yesterday
when he sneaked "an amendment to an inconspicuous bill"'" that
provided that so much of the Habeas Corpus Act of February 5,
1867:
as authorizes an appeal from the judgment of the circuit court of
the United States, or the exercise of any such jurisdiction by said
Supreme Court on appeals which have been or may hereafter be
taken, be and the same is, hereby repealed."
"°See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
81 Burton, Two Significant Decisions: Ex Parte Milligan and Ex Parte Mc-
Cardle, 41 A.B.A.J. 121, 176 (1955), and 15 Stat. 44.
8' 15 Stat. 44. See also Burton, note 81 supra.
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The malicious purpose of Thad Stevens was to prevent the Su-
preme Court's review of the court martial of William McCardle,
who, as the editor of a Vicksburg, Mississippi, newspaper, had at-
tacked the then military occupation of Mississippi." Mr. Justice
Burton has stated that this statute was passed eighteen days after
Ex parte McCardle" was argued in the Supreme Court and the
weak Court of that era bowed to the will of Congress and on re-
argument held the statute constitutional, even though retroactive,
and the Court to be without jurisdiction to hear McCardle's appeal
from his Army court martial'-a repudiation by Congress and the
Court of Ex Parte Milligan."
Just as Thad Stevens' amendment was unconstitutional by rob-
bing the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear appeals from federal
courts in habeas corpus for fifteen years, so also is the refusal of the
Supreme Court to hear appeals in diversity cases today unconstitu-
tional.
In principle there is no difference between the refusal of our
highest court to hear diversity cases, and the proposed bill to cut off
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear appeals by applicants
refused admission to state bars,"' which Lyndon Johnson, when
Majority Leader, defeated by a very close vote.88 The Supreme
Court of the United States is the third branch of our government
and under the Constitution its supreme jurisdiction should not be
reduced by the President, the Congress nor especially by itself.
This viciousness of the mistake called Erie is the effect it has had
on the Court's hearing diversity cases. The Court refuses to review
them leaving their disposition to the district courts and the courts
of appeal.
In all honesty, if the Court possesses this power, why does it not
order the district courts and the courts of appeal not to entertain the
83 Burton, note 81 supra.
8473 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1868).
8 5Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
8771 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1867).
"rThe principal cases were Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S.
252 (1957) and Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S.
252 (1957). In both cases the United States Supreme Court reviewed state ac-
tion, remanding in Konigsberg and directing admission in Schware.
88 On March 3, 1958, Senator Butler of Maryland introduced S. 3386 in the
85th Congress, Second Session to cut off review of state bar admission cases by
the Supreme Court of the United States; 104 CONG. REC. 3187 (1958).
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cases? What the Supreme Court has done since Erie is to refuse to
review diversity cases and by this action it abdicates its jurisdic-
tional position in our constitutional scheme.
Of course, with thousands of petitions for certiorari being filed
each year, it is easy for the Court to eliminate from the applications
for certiorari all those filed in diversity cases.
Recently, Mr. Justice Tom Clark stated that during his tenure on
the Court, one of his experienced clerks performed this function
thereby reducing the number of petitions for certiorari that he need
examine."9 He added that, of course, when there was a conflict be-
tween circuits, he would sometimes vote to hear without reading.
Perhaps, the worst case that Chief Justice Warren ever read was
his lamentable decision in Richards v. United States."° In that case
an American Airlines' plane fell in Missouri, which then limited
liability to 15,000 dollars."' Alleging there was negligence in Ameri-
can Airlines' manufacturing plant in Tulsa, Oklahoma, the plaintiff
sought an unlimited recovery under the law of Oklahoma. The
Chief Justice in writing for a unanimous court, in effect, tells the
plaintiff not to bother the Court with this silly question.
The net result is that the Supreme Court in Richards leaves the
district and circuit courts without direction. And the Court is di-
rectly responsible for the confusion that prevails the country over
in choice of law cases. The Supreme Court has substituted anarchy
in choice of law cases for a rule of law. The following part of the
article is a documentation of this statement.
A. Guest Cases in New York
In Babcock v. Jackson," the New York court allowed the guests
of a Rochester, New York, automobile driver who crashed in
Ontario, Canada, where guests cannot sue drivers, to recover be-
cause New York allows guests to sue their hosts. The court reasoned
that the case was a New York matter and the Rochester family just
fortuitiously happened to be in Ontario at the time of the crash.
But the ink was hardly dry on Babcock v. Jackson, when in Kell
"Unpublished Speech by Justice Tom Clark at Catholic University Law
School, Feb. 1972.
9369 U.S. 1 (1962).
9' Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (1949).
92 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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v. Henderson"' a Canadian family from Ontario go off on an auto-
mobile drive to New York and crash at Massena, New York. Un-
expectedly, New York's intermediate court, the Appellate Division
for the Third Department allowed recovery.' The Canadian family
is subject to Ontario law but since the crash was in New York,
where guests are free to sue hosts, the Appellate Division allows
recovery.
The rule in New York under Babcock and Kell requires one to
throw his brains out the window, shout infinity and roll New York's
loaded dice, heads, the plaintiff wins, tails, the defendant loses.
Would New York act in this anarchial way if the Supreme Court
of the United States in Richards had done its constitutional duty
and decided the choice of law points?
Recall what Alexander Hamilton said in THE FEDERALIST:
The union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers
for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an injury,
ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it. As
the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, is
with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow,
that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in
which citizens of other countries are concerned."
In one guest case, Dym v. Gordon," New York denied recovery.
There the guest and the host were both students and New Yorkers
in summer school at the University of Colorado. Reversing the cor-
rect ruling of Mr. Justice Bernard Meyer at Special Term, Nassau
County, the court of appeals applied Colorado law, which makes
recovery in guest cases next to impossible.
Yet it was immediately following the decision of Dym v. Gordon
when Senator Kenneth Keating, then a judge on the New York
Court of Appeals, spoke for an almost unanimous court of appeals
in allowing recovery by guests against the New York owner for an
accident in Michigan,"' which has a guest statute making recovery
by a guest difficult, if not impossible. 8
'a26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966).
94 Id.
"s See note 12 supra.
96 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
7 Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519
(1969).
"MICH. COMP. LAWS S 257.401 (1967).
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Tooker v. Lopez is distinguishable from Dym v. Gordon. The
two guests in Lopez were full time students at the University of
Michigan and not mere summer students. Moreover, in Lopez
while the host and one plaintiff guest are New Yorkers, the other
guest does not hail from either New York or Michigan and the case
does not say whether the nation or state from which the guest hails
has a guest statute.
And in Tooker v. Lopez Judge Keating assured us that no foreign
jurisdiction with a guest statute can expect to have it honored when
the insurer is a New Yorker and the suit is in New York. Alas, with
Ex-Judge Keating away as Ambassador to India, his court repu-
diates his opinion by saying in Neumeier v. Keuhner" on July 7,
1972, that when a defendant is a New Yorker, licensed and insured
in New York, and he has an accident in Ontario, that province's
guest statute applies if plaintiff be a Canadian suing in the New
York state courts.
As Judge Bergan said in dissent:
There is a difference of fundamental character between justifying
a departure from lex loci delictus because the court will not, as a
matter of policy, permit a New York owner of a car licensed and
insured in New York to escape a liability that would be imposed on
him here; and a departure based on the fact that a New York resi-
dent makes the claim for injury. The first ground of departure is
justifiable as sound policy; the second is justifiable only if one is
willing to treat the rights of a stranger permitted to sue in New
York differently from the way a resident is treated. Neither because
of "interest" nor "contact" nor any other defensible ground is it
proper to say in a court of law that the rights of one man whose
suit is accepted shall be adjudged differently on the merits on the
basis of where he happens to live."
B. Airplane Cases In New York and Pennsylvania
In Kilberg v. Northeast Air Lines, Inc."' there was an action by
the personal representative of a deceased New Yorker who was
9 -N.Y.S.2d -, - N.E.2d -, (July 7, 1972) cited in 1972 N.Y.L.J.
5 (Aug. 11). The decision flies in the face of the principles of Tooker v. Lopez
and as Judge Bergan in his dissent in Neumeier states, "What the court is deciding
today is that although it will prevent a New York car owner from asserting the
defense of a protective foreign statute when a New York resident in whose rights
it has an 'interest' sues; it has not such 'interest' when it accepts the suit in New
York of a nonresident. This is an inadmissible distinction."
100 Id.
1019 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
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killed when a Northeast Air Lines' plane crashed at Nantucket,
Massachusetts.
In the nation called New York there is unlimited recovery for
wrongful death;1"2 while in the nation called Massachusetts there
was then a limit of 15,000 dollars."3
The New York court in Kilberg denied the motion to dismiss the
complaint for recovery of 15,000 dollars and stated that in suing
in the New York courts the plaintiff may rely on the Massachusetts
statute to obtain recovery for damages for wrongful death free from
the Massachusetts 15,000 dollar limit.
There is not one line in the Kilberg opinion concerning the Con-
stitution of the United States nor with respect to any of the clauses
in that document that are conceivably applicable, namely, the com-
merce clause,"' article III, 0 full faith and credit, 0 ' privileges and
immunities,' due process, equal protection or the just compensa-
tion clause in the fifth amendment.'
Kilberg is a naked claim by New York to allow recovery for New
Yorkers irrespective of the law of any other nation or state. It is a
claim of which this author as a native New Yorker, is as ashamed
of his state as Texans must be of the awful opinion by Abe Fortas
for the Supreme Court in United States v. Yazell, 0' when he allowed
a Texan to escape liability on a note to the Small Business Admin-
istration because she was a married woman and a nonentity under
Texas law.
Moreover, the absurdity known as Kilberg was followed by
Pearson v. Northeast Air Lines, Inc."' Pearson came to trial in the
Southern District of New York before United States District Judge
John McGohey along with an action by a Mrs. Truitt, a New Jersey
citizen, whose husband had also been killed in the Nantucket
10"N.Y. CONST., art. 1, § 16 provides: "The right of action now existing to
recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated; and
the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation."
'
3 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229 § 2 (1955).
'o U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8.
'0' U.S. CONST. art. III.
... U.S. CONST. art. IV.
10. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
10' U.S. CONST. amend. V.
100382 U.S. 341 (1966).
"o 199 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.), but
afJ'd in part 309 F.2d 553 (en banc 2d Cir. 1962).
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crash." Before the case went to the jury, Judge McGohey ruled
that with respect to widow Pearson he would follow Kilberg and
charge the jury it could allow any amount of damages, but with
respect to widow Truitt, he would charge the jury it could only
allow the 15,000 dollar limit in the Massachusetts statute.
Under these circumstances, Mrs. Truitt settled for 15,000 dol-
lars... even though at that time New Jersey had not adopted New
York's conflict of laws approach, as in Babcock v. Jackson."'
This ruling of Judge McGohey is clearly wrong because New
Jersey is not Afganistan and under Klaxon v. Stentor,1" the law is
that the district court must follow the rule of the forum, which is as
much Kilberg for the New Jersey widow as the New York widow.
Both their husbands were on the same plane.
Even if the law of New York is that the law of the place is to
apply, in the absence of a decision by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, the district court would be free to find the law of New Jersey.
Whatever the law of New Jersey was then, of course, today it is
clear that New Jersey has mounted the New York band wagon and
allows unlimited recovery in an even more liberal way than New
York. " '
This ruling in Pearson by the district court turned out to be a
very unjust one for the widow Truitt, wrong under the law of New
York, wrong under the law of New Jersey and in our opinion,
wrong under federal common law. How wrong can one case be?
When the jury returned a verdict of 132,000 dollars in Pearson,
Judge McGohey added six per cent interest in accordance with the
New York law and entered a 160,000 dollar judgment for Mrs.
Pearson.
The Second Circuit reversed holding that under the full faith
and credit clause, the trial court was bound to the 15,000 dollar
limit in the Massachusetts statute.1 '
Thereafter, plaintiff petitioned for an en banc court of appeals
that upheld the jury verdict of 132,000 dollars but reversed Judge
" 199 F. Supp. at 539.
112 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
1
1 Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
114 Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in N.Y., 1963 DUKE L.J. 1 at 7 n.21.
l Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970).
116307 F.2d 553 (en banc 2d Cir. 1962).
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McGohey's allowance of six per cent interest."' Thus, this otherwise
great court of appeals gave no consideration to the constitutionality
of the Massachusetts statute, and a ridiculous result that allowed
recovery of unlimited damages under the law of New York but dis-
allowed interest under the same law of New York. Why should New
York law govern damages but not interest?
How does this decision reconcile with Klaxon v. Stentor, itself
an interest case, when the Supreme Court chains Erie to the law of
the forum?
Naturally, this method of deciding cases is contagious. Pennsyl-
vania contracted the disease and without questioning the constitu-
tionality of the Colorado wrongful death statute in Griffth v. United
Air Lines, Inc."' allowed unlimited recovery for Pennsylvania citi-
zens killed when an United Air Lines' D.C.-8 crashed at Denver.
In Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc."' the defendant
crashed a plane over Elkton, Maryland, and New York allowed un-
limited recovery to Pennsylvania citizens killed there. The suit was
in the New York state courts and of course Pan American Airways
could not remove. It is a New York corporation with its principal
place of business in New York.
Griflth established Pennsylvania as a state permitting unlimited
recovery in airplane wrongful death cases. Taken together, Griffth
and Van Dusen v. Barrack,"' in which Judge Van Dusen was pro-
hibited from transferring the case to Boston (the plane in question
having crashed in Boston Harbor), means that on the law side of
federal district courts in Pennsylvania a plaintiff, such as Griffth, is
entitled to unlimited recovery.
Even today, under section 1407 of Title 28,121 in multidistrict
cases, the statute only allows transfer for discovery. Recovery is to
be in the district where plaintiff sues.
It would have been better to have upheld Judge Van Dusen's
order of transfer to Boston in Van Dusen v. Barrack. From that
crash at Boston, more than 100 actions were brought in federal
... 309 F.2d 553 (en banc 2d Cir. 1962).
28416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
119 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965).
12376 U.S. 612 (1964).
12128 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
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courts across the country.' Why not have one judge and one court
in Boston determine liability for all? Is the individual calendar sys-
tem confined to each district court?
C. Wrongful Death in Admiralty
A transfer of the Boston Harbor plane crash cases from Phila-
delphia to Boston was, regretably, too sensible for men of law.
Rather, the Supreme Court denied the transfer"' thus evading the
main issue, namely the applicable law under the United States Con-
stitution, whether the lawsuit is in Boston or Philadelphia.
Moreover, in a day of crowded courts and litigation delay, there
was danger that too intelligent a decision as the transfer of all the
litigation to the scene of the crash in Boston might cause the laity
to think well of the United States Supreme Court.
Article III of the Constitution vests the fedreal courts with ad-
miralty jurisdiction, and when the action is in personam and not
in rem the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction," but, of course,
the applicable law is federal admiralty law.
When Eastern's plane fell into Boston Harbor with numerous
Philadelphia citizens aboard, a number of suits in admiralty were
instituted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania."
In one case,' the Third Circuit was content to say that the suit
would lie in admiralty because it involved a maritime tort.
In Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, 7 however, the Third Circuit faced
the choice of law question. The trial judge sitting there in admiralty
without a jury in an action against Eastern Air Lines for the Boston
Harbor Electra crash followed Grifith that had followed Pearson.
A panel of the Third Circuit reversed in a powerful opinion by
Chief Judge Hastie relying on the admiralty decisions of the
12 Tydings, Air Crash Litigation: A Judicial Problem and a Congressional
Solution, 18 AM. U.L. REV. 299 (1969).
12 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
" See Justice Brennan's opinion in The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588
(1959).
" See Keeffe, In Praise of Joseph Story, Swift v. Tyson, and The True Na-
tional Common Law, 18 AM. U.L. REv. 316 (1969).
126 Weinstein v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
227 Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 979 (1968).
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Supreme Court of the United States, particularly The Tungus"'
and Hess v. United States' in which a divided Supreme Court in
effect held that, since there is no action for damages for wrongful
death in admiralty apart from the Jones Act or the Death on the
High Seas Act, a United States district court must allow or deny re-
covery depending upon what the state statute provides. As in Pear-
son, the losing plaintiffs asked and received an en banc Third Cir-
cuit court that reversed the Panel and allowed recovery, some judges
on the theory of Griffith, some on Klaxon and some on admiralty
and some on all three grounds. Once again, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari, making certain that no one in America could ever
tell what law governs an action for wrongful death in admiralty.
Fortunately for the profession this uncertainty came to an end
when the Supreme Court of the United States decided Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc."' There, the deceased was killed while
working as a longshoreman in Florida territorial waters. The United
States district court felt obligated under decisions of the Supreme
Court prior to Moragne"'3 to follow the Florida wrongful death
statute even in admiralty. Since, however, the Florida statute does
not permit recovery based on the admiralty doctrine of unseaworthi-
ness, on the facts the district court dismissed, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed."'
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that since
neither the Jones Act"3 nor the Death on the High Seas Act" pro-
vides remedies for deaths occurring within state waters, then Con-
gress intended state law to govern."
Justice Harlan, however, observing that both the Jones Act and
DOHSA were designed to achieve uniformity in the exercise of
admiralty jurisdiction, states:
Our recognition of a right to recover for wrongful death under
general maritime law will assure uniform vindication of federal
128 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
'29361 U.S. 314 (1960).
"'3398 U.S. 375 (1970).
"' Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960); Goett v. Union Carbide Co.,
361 U.S. 340 (1960); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
3' Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969).
3346 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
"-46 U.S.C. § 761-68 (1970).
'3 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395 (1970).
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policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies that have resulted
from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to ex-
clusively maritime substantive concepts. 13 6
Accordingly, the Court held that recovery for wrongful death can
be allowed in admiralty.
By this decision, Justice John Harlan is using statutes to make
common law"' when statutes express the legislative will and there
are gaps in which the statutes do not specifically apply or the point
is one of first impression and the policy of the statute fits.
Some may wish to argue that removing the bar to recovery here
is merely a limited extension of DOHSA or state law. But Justice
Harlan does not tie himself to this narrow interpretation; he goes
much further. He holds that general maritime law is the federal
common law of admiralty."' It exists independent of the Jones Act,
DOSHA or state law.
Recognizing that choice of law problems in admiralty were ag-
gravated by The Harrisburg,"' which Moragne expressly over-
rules,' Justice Harlan declares:
[T]he recognition of a remedy for wrongful death under general
maritime law can be expected to bring more placid waters.'
Of course, Moragne involves a maritime tort but does it apply
to aircraft crashes?
As this analogy begins to crystallize, the potential significance of
Justice Harlan's decision in Moragne likewise begins to emerge.
The existence of federal common law is apparent (Brandeis, J. not-
withstanding) ,' and if there is a general maritime law that is being
invoked to provide uniformity in a field that desperately needs it,
then why should not the Supreme Court follow Justice Harlan's lead
and extend Moragne to create a general federal common law of
aviation?
An extension of the principles enunciated in Moragne would be
"I Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
13'Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATHOLIC U.L.
REV. 401 (1968).
13 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 402 (1970).
139 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
'l Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970).
141 Id. at 408.
'"' Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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logical because the analogy between air and maritime commerce is
compelling. Both are essentially interstate and international, and
the courts are faced with the same choice of law problems in avia-
tion accidents as in maritime mishaps.
In one of its first tests, the extension of the principles of Moragne
into aircrash litigation, and especially the spirit of that decision, has
received a setback in the Third Circuit. In Dugas v. National Air-
craft Corp.,"' Judge Van Dusen speaking for himself and Judges
Biggs and Rosenn ruled that DOHSA is not the exclusive remedy
for an aircrash outside the three mile territorial limit. Rather the
Third Circuit held that DOHSA precludes the use of state wrongful
death statutes only, and thus the Pennsylvania survival statute may
be employed to supplement the amount of damages."
In that case, two teenage girls, Kathryn Dugas and Christina
Hart, were killed when the private plane in which they were flying
crashed at sea enroute from South Caicos in the Bahamas to San
Juan, Puerto Rico. The parties stipulated that the accident occurred
in international waters and that DOHSA was the applicable federal
statute.1"5
At the conclusion of a hearing on the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, the district court ruled that the DOHSA was
not the sole remedy but that any award under that statute could be
supplemented by the state survival statute.4"
Following the trial in admiralty, the court made awards pursuant
to both the DOHSA and the Pennsylvania state survival statute. The
defendant appealed from this ruling.
Judge Van Dusen succinctly stated the issue of the case saying
that:
[T]he Courts have clearly held that the need for uniformity re-
quires that the Act supersede any state wrongful death statute.
However, it is not so clear whether the Act preempts the separate
and distinct remedy encompassed in the state survival statutes
which preserve in the administrator of the decedent's estate that
cause of action for pain and suffering which the decedent had until
the moment of her death ....
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In a well written opinion, Judge Van Dusen goes on to trace the
legislative history of the Act and many pre-Moragne decisions. He
concludes that Congress did not intend to preclude the use of state
survival statutes wherever applicable. "8
In -this decision, Judge Van Dusen misunderstands Moragne,
which pleads for a uniform common law of admiralty when DOHSA
is silent.
It has been aptly stated 14 9 that it is "mere sophistry""' to extend
Pennsylvania's survival statute beyond the three mile limit to cover
an aircrash somewhere between San Juan and the Bahamas. The
"maritime but local" doctrine, which seems to be the court's ration-
ale, is basically faulty because traditionally, "local" has meant
within territorial waters."' Moreover, there is neither rhyme nor
reason to overruling The Harrisburg, and precluding the use of
state wrongful death statutes either in territorial waters or on the
high seas, on one hand, while allowing state survival statutes to be
applied to any maritime accident on the other.
Judge Van Dusen seems to have missed a further distinction
when he said:
A refusal to permit an award under the state survival statute will
result in a distinction between the recovery which could be had on
land and that on the high seas, a distinction which is unreasonable
and unnecessary. 5'
The Court fails to see that it holds for a different award for
deaths on land and on the high seas. Deaths on the high seas are
governed by federal statutes and general maritime law welded into
one uniform body of admiralty law, which is neither restricted nor
liberalized by the laws of the states where the federal court sits.
That is the spirit of Moragne and that is what Dugas violates.
Despite the Dugas decision, hopefully the magnificent opinion
of John Harlan in Moragne will not only point the way to recovery
of damages for wrongful death (both for loss of life and pain and
suffering) not only in admiralty but also in diversity. It is absurd
1
48 Id. at 1390.
"'Craig and Alexander, Wrongful Death in Aviation and Admiralty: Prob-
lems of Federalism, Tempests and Teapots, 37 J. AIR L. & COM. 3 (1971).
"old. at 33.
"' Curtis v. Garcia Y Cia, 241 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1957).
"'Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386, 1391 (3d Cir. 1971).
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for federal courts to perpetuate the distinction between damages for
loss of life and pain and suffering. It is far better to allow one re-
covery under federal common law for both as Moragne teaches.
One thing is certain, Moragne clears up the doubts expressed in
Scott v. Eastern Air Lines between the Panel and the en banc court
allowing recovery either in diversity or admiralty for estates of
victims of the Boston Harbor crash.' It also answers the ques-
tions raised when planes crash into the Great Lakes as in Harris v.
United Air Lines, Inc.
14
Justice Harlan in Moragne does not deal with whether a passen-
ger suffering wrongful death on the high seas can sue under his
own state law in addition to a remedy under DOHSA. Rather,
Moragne only discusses the right to sue for wrongful death under
the admiralty doctrine of unseaworthiness when the death occurs in
territorial waters when DOHSA does not apply.
If the wrongful death occurs on the high seas, however, section
6 of the Death on the High Seas Act" specifically gives the named
beneficiaries the right to sue under state law for damages for wrong-
ful death. Under Kilberg and other cases, New York allows suit for
deaths occuring outside New York. Whereas DOHSA has a two
year statute of limitation,"' New York has three."' The beneficiaries
allowed to sue under DOHSA are also different from those allowed
to sue under state law.
Query, notwithstanding that Congress so intended in section 6 of
the DOHSA and state law so permits, can the Congress constitu-
tionally so limit admiralty jurisdiction? The debates concerning sec-
tion 6 of DOHSA indicate that Congress was aware of this point
but, upset by The Harrisburg, provided section 6 as a protection."'
Perhaps now that Moragne has read The Harrisburg out of ad-
miralty law, the Court in the interests of uniformity in admiralty
can now safely read section 6 out of DOHSA. Let's hope so.
"'Compare the decision of Judge Hastie in Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, 399
F.2d 14, 16 (3d Cir.) with the en banc decision, 399 F.2d 14, 18 (3d Cir. 1963).
"' Harris v. United Air Lines, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 431 (S.D. Iowa 1967).
"'46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970).
15846 U.S.C. § 763 (1970).
"5 N.Y. Civ. PRc. § 214 (McKinney 1972).
"' Act of March 30, 1920, Pub. L. No. 165, § 6, 41 Stat. 537.
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D. Jurisdiction In Wrongful Death by Attaching Insurance Policies
Although Kilberg was outrageous and it forced ridiculous con-
tortions in federal courts in Pearson, Kilberg seems truly miniscule
in comparison with the absurd limits to which the New York courts
have pushed Kilberg and Babcock in Seider v. Roth."'
There a husband and wife were injured in a three car accident in
Vermont, involving the Seiders, Roth and one Lemeux from Can-
ada. The couple, who were New York citizens, filed against Lemeux
in New York by obtaining an attachment on
... the contractual obligation of Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Co. to defend and indemnify Lemeux under a policy of automobile
liability issued in Canada by Hartford to Lemeux."'
By a slim four to three decision, the court of appeals of New
York, with Chief Judge Desmond writing the opinion, upheld this
attachment. The key issue was whether an attachment of this form
of "debt" was what New York's statute was intended to cover.''
Chief Judge Desmond finds this issue rather simple. In his words:
The Hartford policy is in customary form. It requires Hartford,
among other things, to defend Lemeux in any automobile negli-
gence action and, if judgment be rendered against Lemeux, to in-
demnify him therefore. Thus, as soon as the accident occurred
there was imposed on Hartford a contractual obligation which
should be considered a "debt" within the necessary meaning of
CPLR 5201 and 6202.6'
The majority also heavily relied on In re Matter of Riggle's
Estate"3 for the proposition that the "debt" of a liability insurance
policy is personal property. It was only one short step for the court
to conclude that the attachment of a liability insurance policy issued
by a New York based carrier is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction in
the New York courts over an accident between a New York plain-
tiff and a non-resident defendant for an accident occurring outside
New York.
Judge Adrian Burke in his dissent feels that the only time a debt
comes into being is if a judgment is awarded to the plaintiff and the
1" 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
'60 17 N.Y.2d at 112, 269 N.E.2d at 313.
11 17 N.Y.2d at 113, 269 N.E.2d at 314.
162 Id.
163 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962).
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defendant actually has to pay. Thus, in Judge Burke's view, a judg-
ment against the insured defendant must precede any attachment of
the debt under the insurance policy.
The Seider doctrine has received a bad press from legal pun-
dits."' It ought to. It smacks of provincialism, namely for New
Yorkers. A year later, the Seider doctrine was half-heartedly affirm-
ed in Simpson v. Loehmann,"5 only after Judge Breitel mistakenly
joined the majority out of "team spirit" although he admits the de-
cision was wrong. The opposition continued until Judge Croake of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in Podolsky v. Devinney'" finally ruled the Seider attachment
unconstitutional primarily because of section 320(c) of the CPLR,
which he construed as preventing a suit in rem's being defended on
the merits unless the defendant submits to full in personam juris-
diction."'
Following Judge Croake's decision in Simpson the defendant
subsequently moved for re-argument, 8 and the court of appeals,
in what is known as "a miraculous per curiam.'.. decision informed
Judge Croake that he had misinterpreted the New York statutes
i.e., that under a Seider type attachment a defendant is free to de-
fend on the merits without subjecting himself to in personam juris-
diction beyond the policy limits. Thus, notwithstanding Judge
Croake, Seider was re-affirmed.
Query whether this per curiam can be limited only to defense of
Seider v. Roth type attachments. Does not the reason for the deci-
sion apply to all attachments in New York and elsewhere?
In 1968, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit sitting first as a panel, then en banc, surprisingly upheld a
Seider v. Roth attachment in Minichiello v. Rosenberg."' Judge
Henry Friendly wrote the majority opinion for himself and Judge
Feinberg with Judge Anderson dissenting.
'" See, e.g., Reese, The Expanding Scope of Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents
-New York Goes Wild, 35 INS. COUNSEL J. 118 (1968).
16521 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
160 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
107 281 F. Supp. at 495.
"'Motion for re-argument denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
'Siegel, Commentary on N.Y. Civ. Prac. § 5201 (McKinney Supp. 1968)
at 15.
170410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968).
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In that case, Marie Minichiello, a New York resident, sued for
personal injuries and damages for the death of her husband,
Thomas, arising from an auto accident near Harrisburg, Pennsyl-
vania, who had collided with Rosenberg, a Pennsylvania citizen.
Jurisdiction was obtained by attaching an automobile liability in-
surance policy issued to Rosenberg by All-State Insurance Com-
pany that was doing business in New York. Rosenberg removed
to the United States District Court for the Western District of New
York and there sought dismissal on the grounds that a Seider at-
tachment violates the Constitution of the United States.
The "sina qua non" for Judge Friendly was whether New York
can constitutionally provide a "direct action against an insurer do-
ing business in New York by a New York resident with respect to
an injury suffered elsewhere.''. In finding that New York has the
power, Chief Judge Friendly cited Watson v. Employer's Liability
Assurance Co., 172 which upheld a direct action against an insurer
in Louisiana for an accident that took place in Louisiana. In Mini-
chiello as in Seider, however, the accident occurs outside New
York. Nevertheless, Judge Henry Friendly still applied Watson
arguing that there Justice Black realized the potential problems in
bringing defendants in Seider type cases before the courts of the
plaintiff's home state.' He reasons from Watson that the Supreme
Court would approve direct action statutes to insure a forum for
the plaintiff in his home state.
Judge Friendly also touches the res judicata problem raised by
Podolsky and circumvented by Simpson on rehearing, by admitting
the possibility that some other jurisdiction may hold that a decision
based on a Seider type attachment is res adjudicata in a suit in
personam in a distant state for recovery beyond the face value of
the insurance policy attached.' 4 Although real, this possibility, is
not considered sufficient to vacate Seider. As Judge Friendly says:
To be sure it may be cold comfort to a non-resident defendant
to have our assurance that if some state should be so misguided as
to consider a New York Seider judgment as concluding him, he
will be able to have this ruling overturned by the Supreme Court of
'17 410 F.2d at 109.
172348 U.S. 66 (1954).
17
3Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1968).
1141d. at 111-12.
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the United States. But we cannot fairly hold that New York has
denied due process merely because of the possibility that some
other state may do so.""5
Somehow the thread of logic and constitutionality is missing in
Judge Friendly's approach.
An important factor in Minichiello, which Judge Friendly merely
glosses over, is that the accident did not occur in plaintiff's state,
but rather, in the defendant's home state or some third state. It
seems that this difference should be fatal to a Seider v. Roth type
attachment because the long-arm statutes and minimum contact
cases upon which Judge Friendly relies ' are predicated on the de-
fendant's contact with the place of the tort.
Judge Anderson, dissenting to both the first hearing7 and the
rehearing en banc in Minichiello, 8 interprets the Seider v. Roth
procedure of deciding liability in a forum other than the place of
the tort as a denial of due process. He reads the "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice" doctrine of International Shoe'
as the proper test rather than Watson. If the balancing of interests
enunciated in International Shoe are employed, Judge Anderson
quite rightly concludes:
a direct action statute purporting to provide a New York forum
for a New York plaintiff, regardless of other local contacts or con-
siderations, is unreasonable and parochial in the due process
sense.180
But he also warns:
As a result each party will commence suit as quickly as possible in
an endeavor to have the litigation in the state where he resides.
It would also appear to be a natural and logical consequence of the
approval of the Seider procedure that retaliatory laws will be
751d. at 112.
176International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
177410 F.2d at 113.
178410 F.2d at 120.
"'1International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). It should be
noted, as Anderson does in his dissent, that the Seider result does not square
with the previous rulings on direct action statutes, which were allowed only if
the accident occurred within the state seeking to invoke jurisdiction. Guess v.
Read, 290 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 957 (1962); Honey-
cutt v. Indiana Lumbermans Mut. Ins. Co., 130 So. 2d 770 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
190Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 117 (2d Cir. 1968).
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adopted by other states to impose certain conditions upon residents
from Seider procedure states to protect the states' own residents
from being subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign state. This is
likely to impose a serious burden on interstate travel and com-
merce. It is also reasonably certain that the adoption of this pro-
cedure will work a substantial increase in the cost of insurance,
which is not in the public interest.'81
The modem long-arm statute actually rests on the assumption
that Pennoyer v. Neff"' was wrongly decided in that a man, such
as Neff, who does business with a lawyer named Mitchell in Port-
land, Oregon, with respect to land in Oregon, should be subject to
service of process in personam either by publication, or by the
Sheriff of Multomah County at the Palace Hotel in San Francisco,
where Neff lives and drinks in perpetuity for the amusement and
education of law students.
But not the most violent critic of what, for clarity, is called Mit-
chell v. Neff, has ever had the temerity to suggest that if Mitchell
had represented Neff in Dade County, Florida, with respect to land
there instead of in Portland with respect to Multomah County land,
that Neff would have been subject to service of process in Oregon
either by publication in the Pacific Coast Christian Advocate news-
paper or personally by the Sheriff of Multnomah at the Palace Hotel
bar.
It could be that Judge Henry Friendly does not understand either
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins or Pennoyer v. Neff.
In Minichiello, the Second Circuit has thrown holy water on a
dirty Irish trick by which a New Yorker can sue in his native state
with respect to an accident miles away in another state or country
by the levy of an attachment against a national or international in-
surance carrier.
Direct suit in New York against an insurance carrier, such as
Hartford, with respect to a Vermont accident is an unreasonable
burden on commerce and therefore unconstitutional. It also violates
procedural due process since the courts of Vermont are open to the
plaintiff and putting venue of Vermont automobile accidents in
New York is as much against the national interest as permitting
victims of airplane accidents to sue other than at the scene of the
crash.
181 Id.
18295 U.S. 714 (1877).
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Granted if the plane or automobile crashed in Afganistan, or if
the defendant was served personally in New York, there might be
some special reason, e.g. statute of limitations, why New York
should be allowed to entertain the suit. Normally, the doctrine of
forum non conviens should prevent New York's assuming jurisdic-
tion if the courts of the place of the accident are open and fair.
There is no reason why New York, by a Seider v. Roth attach-
ment, should be allowed to burden the already overcrowded state
and federal courts of New York with a Vermont personal injury
case. Neither should courts place the additional costs of defending
these actions on national insurance carriers knowing that additional
expense of defense in New York will be paid by increased insurance
premiums. This is but another concrete example of how Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins is a burden on the firms in America that do a na-
tional business.
Quite inconsistently in Farrell v. Piedmont Air Lines, Inc.,'" the
Second Circuit refused to allow non-residents to sue in New York
by a Seider v. Roth type of attachment.
How can Minichiello and Farrell be reconciled? Why should it
make any difference that the plaintiff in a Seider v. Roth type at-
tachment happens to be a New York resident?
The decision in Farrell unmasks the decision in Minichiello as
being an unconstitutional discrimination in favor of residents and
against non-residents in violation of the fourteenth amendment, due
process, privileges and immunities and equal protection.
In truth the more one studies these New York decisions, the more
discriminatory in favor of New Yorkers they become and for this
reason flagrantly unconstitutional. Judge Bergan alone sees them
for what they are.
VII. LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION'"
The Warsaw Convention was ratified in the 1920's and limits
liability of airplane carriers for wrongful death or personal injury to
8500 Poincare francs or about 8,200 dollars.'85 To say the conven-
"3411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969).
84 Convention For the Unification Of Certain Rules Relating To International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 29, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 [hereinafter
cited as the Warsaw Convention].
195 Warsaw Convention, art. 22(1).
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tion is very much out of date is an understatement. Moreover, the
Convention has no application to manufacturers of airplanes, only
to carriers. To be applicable to a carrier, the trip must be on an in-
ternational ticket between two countries that are signatories to the
Warsaw Convention.'" Of course once the trip begins on the inter-
national ticket, the Warsaw Convention limit governs even though
the plane falls within the continental United States.
Today, in 1972 it is hard to understand how the United States
could ever have agreed to the treaty. But the rationale that inspired
the Warsaw Convention is the same rationale that caused the enact-
ment of wrongful death statutes. For example, the Massachusetts
statute, involved in Kilberg and Pearson limits damages for wrong-
ful death to 15,000 dollars. Its purpose was to encourage companies
to build canals and roads. ' Similarly, the purpose of the Warsaw
Convention was to encourage airplane carriers to fly passengers
overseas.188
For this reason wrongful death statutes in this modern world
have come to be known as "back-up" statutes in that the astute
driver knowing an injured man in Massachusetts can sue for un-
limited damages is encouraged to back up and kill his victim so
that his estate will be limited to suing for 15,000 dollars. Further-
more, the same philosophy of aiding businesses with a high degree
of risk caused states with wrongful death statutes to limit recovery
to "gross" negligence, and to deny recovery to the legal representa-
tive of the deceased and all except close dependent relatives. For
instance, in Maryland an airline can kill non-breeders with im-
punity.'
8 9
To suggest that any federal district court judge in the land should
be bound by a genuinely inane law is an insult to his intelligence.
Just as Justice Harlan, in Moragne uses common law to repudi-
ate The Harrisburg and bring actions for wrongful death occurring
in territorial waters in line with the Jones Act and DOHSA, our
186Warsaw Convention, art. 1(2).
1' See Anderson, A Model State Wrongful Death Act, 1 HARV. J. LEGIS. 28
(1964).
188See Preamble to the Warsaw Convention, Oct. 29, 1934, 49 Stat. 3013,
T.S. No. 876.
189 MD. ANN. CODE, art. 67, § 4 (1957) wherein a cause of action is created
only for the surviving spouse, parent and child of the deceased, or a person who
was wholly dependent on him. Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 16
N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965).
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federal courts should likewise permit recovery of unlimited dam-
ages in all airplane cases by applying this same federal common law.
To avoid the damage limitations imposed by the Warsaw Con-
vention reasoning similar to that employed by Judge Bua of
Chicago will have to be employed."1 Unfortunately the case before
Judge Bua involved a Canadian Pacific plane that carried a pas-
senger that boarded at Singapore, which was not a signatory to the
Warsaw Convention. The plane fell in waters off Japan. The court
held that the Warsaw Convention was not binding. 91
He could have added that as a treaty the Warsaw Convention is
held to the same standard as a law of Congress. In Reid v. Covert...
Mr. Justice Black pointed out that treaties are as much if not more,
subject to the Constitution than acts of Congress.'93
Furthermore, one can argue that treaties that are negotiated by
the President and only ratified by the Senate by a two-thirds vote,
should be more strictly construed than laws that to be enacted must
not only receive Presidential approval but also pass both the House
and Senate by majority vote.
In 1965, the State Department lost patience with the limit on
wrongful death in the Warsaw Convention and denounced it."'
When the international air carriers finally agreed at Montreal to pay
75,000 dollars,'95 to anyone lost on a Warsaw Convention flight, the
State Department withdrew its denunciation.'
Query whether it is valid? Query whether there is a legal obliga-
tion under the Warsaw Convention for the United States to pay
anything but 8500 Poincare francs? If the Warsaw Convention im-
poses an insufficient limit on damages for wrongful death, how in
this day and age can it any longer be constitutional?
Just as are The Harrisburg, automobile back-up statutes and
"' Bordell v. Canadian Pacific Air Lines, Ltd., No. 66 L 10799 (Cook Co.
SR Ct. Nov. 7, 1968); see note 125 supra.
191 See note 125 supra, at 353.
192354 U.S. 1 (1957).
191 354 U.S. at 16.
"
4 DEPT. OF STATE RELEASE No. 268 (Nov. 15, 1965).
" "Interim Agreement" (know as Montreal Agreement), Civil Aeronautics
Board Order No. E-23, 680, May 13, 1966. See generally Lowenfield and Men-
delsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 495
(1967).
"'DEPT. OF STATE RELEASE No. 111 (May 14, 1966); DEPT. OF STATE RE-
LEASE No. 110 (May 13, 1966).
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guest statutes, the Warsaw Convention is out of place in the modem
world. It puts an unconstitutional burden on passengers instead of
on the industry in which the risk can be spread over all. The limits
on recovery imposed by the Warsaw Convention takes property in
violation of the fifth amendment for the benefit of the airplane car-
riers, unreasonably restrains airplane travel under the commerce
clause.. and denies passengers privileges and immunities and equal
protection under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment."9 It may also violate the ninth amendment."" Accordingly,
the Supreme Court in Warsaw Convention cases ought to follow
DOHSA and allow unlimited recovery."'
VIII. LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS OF MILITARY PLANES
As shown in Feres v. United States' a man on active duty in uni-
form injured or killed on a military plane cannot sue the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. There is nothing to pre-
vent the service man or his legal representative from suing the
manufacturer of the plane, however, if he has enjoyed government
medical services and hospital treatment, he must on recovery re-
imburse the government for those expenses."'
IX. FERES AND GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
Usually the manufacturer of the government airplane is one of
the major airframe contractors and, for what is known in the in-
surance trade as third-party liability, carries insurance for which
the government reimburses them in their overhead cost."
Perhaps for this reason and out of fear they would lose the in-
surance business, in none of the suits by service personnel against
".. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
"'. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
... U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
" "There is nothing in the history of the passage of the Act ... to indicate
that the accomplishment of its remedial purposes should be construed to cut off
other and distinct remedies." Petition of Gulf Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911, 917,
n.29 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
'°'340 U.S. 135 (1950).
292Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949). Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 1245
(1967); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT (Schwartz & Jacoby ed. 1970).
"3 Testimony in Australia v. Lockheed and Menasco Litigation, note 211
infra.
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airframe manufacturers has there been a defense of no liability
under an extension of the doctrine of Feres v. United States.20' It
is true that the estate of a service man or woman killed in South
Viet Nam by the negligence of the United States cannot recover
any but the benefits provided by the Congress."2 At first glance,
these seem small indeed, but when the benefits accruing to the
family over the years are added together they turn out to be quite
substantial.
Query whether a service injury or death should be given in addi-
tion a recovery against a government contractor? It must be recog-
nized that the government is paying for that recovery by reimburs-
ing the airframe contractors for third party insurance. To this ex-
tent, however, it is denying equal protection to a soldier negligently
killed on the battlefield in South Viet Nam or on the dock going or
coming from there. Furthermore, this recovery is a trap for the
unwary. Many families are ignorant of their right to sue and the
services do not volunteer the details of military aircraft accidents
so that suit by service families is difficult. As a result the airframe
contractors are charged a lower premium for this third party in-
surance than is charged for civilian insurance.20
When the last airship the Navy built crashed, the legal representa-
tives of eleven of the deceased passengers sued the Goodyear Air-
craft Corporation."7 Goodyear did not carry third party insurance
since it was not a regular airframe government contractor. In its
defense Goodyear argued there was no liability because building an
airship like the SST challenges the state of the art so that to
saddle Goodyear with a judgment was in reality giving judgment
against the United States in violation of Feres v. United States.2"'
When the government engages a defense contractor, such as Good-
year, to build weapons on a cost reimbursement basis, the costs
arising out of the performance of the contract belong to the govern-
ment. If therefore, judgment had gone against Goodyear, Uncle
Sam would have had to pick up the check.
24340 U.S. 135 (1950).
202Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
' See the cases generally at notes 205 supra and 211 infra.
207 231 F. Supp. 447.
204340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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The court found the point meritorious but found that Goodyear
was not negligent and therefore dismissed without need to rule on
the defense.20'
X. THE MENASCO FIASCO
2 10
Recently in the Central District of California, a law suit was
brought by Australia against the Lockheed Corporation of Cali-
fornia and the Menasco Manufacturing Company for approxi-
mately five million dollars for the crash of a P-3 Electra airplane,
(the Australians and the Navy refer to it as a P-3 Orion) resulting
from a collapsed landing gear after the Navy had delivered the
plane to Australia.2 " The plane was one of ten purchased by Aus-
tralia through the Pentagon and manufactured as part of a large
contract by Lockheed for the Navy. Menasco manufactured the
landing gear and sold it to Lockheed.
Choice of law once more came into focus. Since the prime con-
tract with Lockheed and the subcontract to Menasco were govern-
ment procurement contracts, it was argued they were subject to
federal common law.
Since the case was settled for an undisclosed consideration prior
to trial there was no need for Judge William Gray to rule on the
point."' As a result the answer to the many questions of choice of
law raised in that interesting litigation will never be known.
The plane in question was delivered to the Navy and accepted as
satisfactory. Then the Navy delivered the plane to Australia and
shortly thereafter, when in the hands of Australia, the plane crash-
ed. ' Had the lawsuit been between the Navy and Lockheed, it
would have been on the contract and under the standard disputes
clause present in government contracts a Contracting Officer would
have initially decided the dispute giving Lockheed the right to ap-
peal to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. If the de-
" 231 F. Supp. 447.
210 This name came from the "Ebasko Fiasco" in the Dixon-Yates case. It
was given there to a plant built at excessive cost by an wholly owned subsidiary
of Electric Bond and Share, named "Ebasko."
I" See No. 69-1623 W.P.G. Civil United States District Court for the Central
District of California, March 1972 and article entitled, The Menasco Fiasco 12
Government Contracts Chronicle 2 (June 16, 1972) (published by Independent
Publishing Co.).
2 231 F. Supp. 447.
$13 Id.
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cision there were adverse to Lockheed, it could then appeal to the
Court of Claims and from there to the Supreme Court of the United
States by certiorari.
Since Australia was not a party to the Navy-Lockheed contract,
however, it asserted its own right to sue both Lockheed and Menas-
co in federal court. In upholding Australia's right to sue in the
United States district court, Judge Gray ruled that "the role of the
United States Navy was that of 'purchasing agent' for Australia. 21.
To this ruling of Judge Gray the United States took exception
and at the direction of the General Counsel of Defense, the United
States Attorney stated:
the position of the United States supported the contentions of Lock-
heed and Menasco, i.e. that the United States in connection with
the purchase of these airplanes by Australia was not that of an
agent but, rather, the transaction was a purchase by the United
States and a sale over to Australia."5
Australia sued on the MacPherson v. Buick"' theories of product
liability, breach of warranty and negligent manufacture of the
plane's landing gear. To save money on the costs per plane, Aus-
tralia had the Navy build its ten planes as part of a larger Navy
contract. In handling the transaction this way, however, the United
States agreed to protect Australia by asserting on Australia's behalf,
and at its request, any liability of Lockheed for breach of warranty.
The difficulty, however, was that if the United States was to act
for Australia, under the disputes clause Lockheed would have to
appeal from an adverse Contracting Officer's decision to the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals.
During the litigation, it was expected that Lockheed or Menasco
would have moved to refer the litigation to the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals by arguing that Australia's warranty
claims were merged into the Navy-Lockheed contract and the court
needed Board advice. Moreover, it could have argued that since
the remedy under the contract was open to Australia, there was no
jurisdiction in the district court until the remedies open to Aus-
tralia under the Navy-Lockheed contract were exhausted. Since,
however, no contention was raised, the correct answer will not be
214 Id.
215 Id.V65217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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known until another foreign country sues another American plane
manufacturer. 1 '
Lockheed and Menasco defended on the ground that if the United
States was the plaintiff, there would have been no liability because
it is the custom and usage of the United States not to hold its air-
craft manufacturers responsible when an entire aircraft is destroyed
by the negligence of a manufacturer.
The Judge, however, did not question the testimony of the Gen-
eral Counsel of the Navy, his Deputy General Counsel and the
Counsel for the Naval Air Systems Command of the Navy when
they stated that under the contract by which Lockheed built the
plane that Lockheed, if negligent, was liable for the loss of the
plane.
Indeed, there was, in the authors' opinion, no basis upon which
he could. Assuming Australia was right in its contention that the
defect in the landing gear was "latent," the inspection clause re-
quired by the General Services Administration to be in the contract,
clearly provided that acceptance of the plane by the Navy was not
conclusive as against "latent defects..... In addition, the Armed
Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR-324.2) forbade any war-
ranty clause in the contract from limiting the rights of the govern-
ment under the inspection clause. No doubt mindful of ASPR-
324.2, before Lockheed signed the contract it insisted that its lia-
bility for latent defects be limited to a period of six months after
the Navy accepted the plane.
But the trial judge allowed the defendants to subpoena accident
files from the Navy and the Air Force and he held that if the Navy
was the plaintiff, there was a custom and usage under which the
United States would not have sued either Lockheed as a prime con-
tractor or Menasco as a subcontractor for damages for the loss of
the plane due to ordinary negligence. 1"'
In addition, he accepted a number of affidavits from former Gen-
eral Counsel of the Navy to the effect that it was Navy policy not
to hold its air frame contractors liable for loss of planes to avoid
217231 F. Supp. 447.
21841 C.F.R. § 1-16.101 (1970); subdivision 5 of Standard Form 32 of June
1964.
211 231 F. Supp. 44.7. See also Order of Judge William P. Gray, date Jan. 10,
filed Jan. 11, 1972.
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the Navy's paying to insure against their loss. Query whether under
section 207 (a) of Title 18 these affidavits related to "particular
matters" these former lawyers for the Navy handled within the
meaning of section 207 (a) of Title 18 and whether in any event
legal ethics permitted their use as against the interest of the United
States and in the aid of private clients?"
In any event, after receipt of the above evidence, Judge Gray
found these facts:
3. For several years prior to the time that the ten planes were
manufactured and sold by Lockheed, and throughout the period of
such manufacture and sale, it was the practice of the United States
not to make damage claims against manufacturers of military air-
craft that it purchased for its own use, in the event of the loss of
such aircraft. This practice was followed irrespective of any con-
clusion that the Navy might hold with respect to such matters as
negligence or breach of warranty on the part of the manufacturer.
4. The practice described in paragraph 3 hereof was maintained
and was generally made known to the airframe industry for two
principal reasons:
(a) In order that the manufacturers might be encouraged to
refrain from obtaining products liability insurance and passing the
premium cost on to the Navy.
(b) Thereby to encourage the manufacturers to cooperate fully,
and without apprehension in the investigations into the causes of
any crashes, in order that such causes might be overcome and simi-
lar accidents thereby avoided in the future."1
Judge Gray also held, however, that this custom or usage did
not bind Australia that "did nothing to cause Lockheed to believe
it would waive any claim of manufacturer's liability." Australia had
actually purchased insurance to cover the dangerous period when
the aircraft was being test flown prior to delivery and acceptance
by the Navy. The price Australia paid "was substantially greater
than the price that the United States would have paid had the air-
craft been for its use."
Accordingly, since Lockheed had solicited the sale of the plane
to Australia and knew Australia to be its purchaser, Judge Gray
held it to be liable if negligent in its manufacture.' Judge Gray
made a similar ruling with respect to Menasco providing only that
220 United States v. Standard Oil, 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See also,
MANNING, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW (1964).
221 231 F. Supp. 447.
id.
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evidence might be offered to establish that Menasco also knew the
plane in question was being purchased by Australia. His ruling left
open the question of liability of Lockheed under the inspection
clause for gross negligence amounting to fraud by ruling that if
the United States was not estopped from suing then neither is
Australia."
There were problems of proof. The Judge Advocate General of
the Navy was opposed to giving details of military aircraft accidents
and stated to the court that there was an agreement to keep the
files secret so that manufacturers will be encouraged to allow their
employees to testify freely about the accidents before military
boards of investigation."
In 1947, Thomas Finletter headed a presidential commission
that recommended an independent board investigate all aircraft
accidents, both civil and military, but nothing came of it."M
Considering the amount of money spent in the development of
aircraft by the military, the soundness of this policy is question-
able. Moreover, even though the United States contributes to the
cost of third-party insurance, this policy keeps aggrieved parties
from ascertaining defects in planes that would allow them to sue
plane manufacturers.
The General Counsel, the Deputy General Counsel and the Coun-
sel for the Naval Air Systems Command who have responsibility
for drawing naval aircraft contracts," have all stated that they did
not know of any policy that would prevent the Navy from exercising
its contract rights," '2 even though the former General Counsel of the
Navy said they did. They were only able to cite one instance, how-
ever, in which the Navy held the manufacturer of a helicopter
liable for the destruction of the craf228 and only one instance when
the Navy asked the Department of Justice to sue a subcontractor
for 132,000 dollars in consequential damages to a plane as the
result of a defect in an item costing 134 dollars. The Justice De-
partment settled the claim after a suit for 92,000 dollars.
223 Id.
VA Id.
I" Report to President Truman at close of World War II.
2 Meritt Steger, General Counsel, Albert H. Stein, Deputy Counsel and
Frederick Sass, Jr., Counsel, Naval Air Systems Command.
227 231 F. Supp. 447.
28 Id.
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Because of custom and usage, Judge Gray ruled that if the United
States was suing Lockheed and Menasco, it would be estopped from
suing on the contract for damages to a plane it had accepted and
for which Lockheed and Menasco would otherwise be liable for
ordinary negligence under the warranty clauses in the contract. He
went on to rule, however, that Australia in its own purchases did
not have this custom or usage and since Lockheed knew Australia
to be the purchaser it was liable under MacPherson v. Buick. 9 for
negligent manufacture of the plane and Menasco was equally liable
if it knew Australia to be the purchaser.
As a result of these rulings, which were made on motions for
summary judgment by both the plaintiff and the defendants, the
parties settled on the eve of the trial. An effort was made before
settlement to appeal Judge Gray's rulings, but he refused to certify
an intermediate appeal under section 1292(b) of Title 28.
The potential outcome of this very important litigation is now
only conjecture.
Insofar as choice of law, however, one can be confident that
Judge Gray would have applied federal common law and, of course,
because of the presence of Australia, the law of nations.
XI. PER ORATIO
The Supreme Court of the United States began to decline in
power and prestige as early as 1812 when it held there was no
federal common law of crimes. Acordingly, in the absence of
special statute, the assasination of an American President, while a
state crime, was not a wrong against our national government.
While the federal courts continued to use common law in de-
ciding civil cases, there was pressure in the nineteenth century, first
in Swift v. Tyson and then in Dred Scott to chain United States dis-
trict courts to state decisions, just or unjust, wise or stupid.
This development is particularly difficult to grasp when article
III of the Constitution so clearly vests the judicial power of this
nation in the federal courts in diversity, admiralty and federal ques-
tion cases.
Dred Scott is an excellent example of the low degree of mentality
229217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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that has reversed Swift v. Tyson and brought us Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins.
All three of these decisions have one thing in common. In each
the state law the federal courts is asked to follow, is as unjust and
diabolical as a legal rule can be.
In Dred Scott and Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins the Supreme Court
blindly follows the unjust state decision making a mockery of Article
III of the Constitution and in Dred Scott contributing to a bloody
and unnecessary war. In contrast to Dred Scott and Erie, Swift v.
Tyson was such a just and wise decision on its facts that it remains
the law of the land.
The war between the states reversed Dred Scott but Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins, while ostensibly remaining the law of the land, is so
fundamentally unsound that United States district courts honor it
more today in the breach than in the observance
Moreover, the four reasons Mr. Justice Brandeis gave for Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins were unsound.
Inasmuch as counsel did not brief or argue for the reversal of
Swift v. Tyson and the majority cavalierly rejected the plea of Jus-
tice Butler in his dissent that the case be put down for reargument
as to the validity of the Warren Research, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomp-
kins was an arbitrary and capricious decision that violates funda-
mental principles of civil liberty.
As Hamilton explained long ago in THE FEDERALIST, there are
solid reasons why in diversity and admiralty cases the federal court
should handle choice of law principles. Moreover, the many ex-
cesses of Erie reduce that decision to an absurdity. What is worse
than anything, however, is the unconstitutional refusal of the Su-
preme Court to take certiorari in diversity cases that district and
circuit courts entertain.
This confines the Supreme Court to police and administrative
law cases, ignoring the principal work lawyers do and giving itself
a bad reputation as a purely political court.
By its decision in Richards v. American Air Lines,"' the Supreme
Court has left choice of law in diversity cases to be decided by each
state as it chooses in violation of the full faith and credit, the com-
merce and just compensation clauses of the Constitution, and in
2-0369 U.S. 1 (1962).
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violation of the holy trinity of the fourteenth amendment, namely
privileges and immunities, equal protection and due process.
The New York and Pennsylvania guest and airplane cases defy
reasoned analysis, smack of provincialism and substitute anarchy
for law. No matter how intellectually dressed, their basis is favor-
itism to residents.
The recent admiralty decision in Moragne written by the late
Justice John Harlan has at last applied federal common law to
allow recovery in admiralty for damages for wrongful death in ter-
ritorial waters and reversed The Harrisburg, which so long denied
a right to sue in admiralty for damages for wrongful death. Thus,
there is hope that the Supreme Court will use the precedent of
Moragne to allow recovery in airplane and guest cases. Otherwise
there will be one rule for planes that crash on water and another
for planes crashing on land.
Certainly there is no constitutional basis for New York by a
Seider v. Roth type attachment to allow its citizens injured else-
where to sue in New York by attaching the insurance policy of the
non-resident defendant. This is a perversion of Pennoyer v. Neff
and gives a direct action against an insurance company doing a na-
tional business in a state where the accident does not occur.
The limitation of liability to 8,200 dollars in the Warsaw Con-
vention is as unconstitutional as similar limitations in state statutes.
Moreover, the President and the Senate were as powerless as the
states to enact this unconstitutional limitation. It is questionable, in-
deed, whether uniformed service personnel on active duty who can-
not sue the United States for negligence should be allowed to sue
manufacturers of military planes.
Admittedly it is good business to keep investigations of military
plane accidents secret, since it prevents plane victims from obtain-
ing information needed to sue. In view of the millions of dollars ex-
pended for the manufacture of airplanes and the danger to secrecy
with respect to plane defects, however, perhaps the time has come
to reconsider the policy. In the recent case in federal court before
Judge Gray, he held that while Australia was free to sue Lockheed
and Menasco for the loss of an Electra plane that the United States
had purchased as agent for Australia, the United States was estopped
from suing on its own behalf because it has so seldom made claims
against plane manufacturers for losses they had no reason to insure.
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This dictum is the more remarkable and questionable because Judge
Gray does not question that under the contract Lockheed was
liable. Can custom and usage void a government contract?
Unfortunately the Australian litigation before Judge Gray was
settled on the eve of trial, but from his preliminary rulings it is quite
clear that he would have resolved the choice of law points in ac-





Subsequent to the presentation of these articles to the Sym-
posium in March of 1972, rule 15 has twice been amended by
Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation. The most recent
amendment, effective August 30, 1972, reads as follows:
RULE 15. TERMINATION AND REMAND
In the absence of unusual circumstances,
(a) Actions terminated in the transferee court by valid judgment, in-
cluding but not limited to summary judgment, judgment of dismissal and
judgment upon stipulation, shall not be remanded by the Panel and shall
be dismissed by the transferee court. The clerk of the transferee court
shall send a copy of the order terminating the action to the Clerk of the
Panel and to the clerk of the transferor court but shall retain the original
files and records unless otherwise directed by the transferee judge or by
the Panel.
(b) Each transferred action that has not been terminated in the trans-
feree court will be remanded to the transferor district for trial, unless
ordered transferred by the transferee judge to the transferee or other
district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406. In the event
that the transferee judge transfers an action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a)
or 1406, an order of remand shall not be necessary to authorize further
proceedings including trial.
(c) The Panel shall consider remand of each transferred action or any
separable claim, cross-claim or third-party claim at or before the con-
clusion of coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings on
(i) motion of any party;
(ii) suggestion of the transferee court; or,
(iii) its own initiative, by entry of an order to show cause, a con-
ditional remand order or other appropriate order.
(d) If remand is sought by motion of a party, the motion shall be
accompanied by:
(i) An affidavit reciting that all common discovery and other pre-
trial proceedings have been completed in the action sought to be re-
manded and that all orders of the transferee court have been
satisfactorily complied with or that remand is otherwise appropriate;
and
(ii) A copy of the transferee court's final pretrial order, where such
order has been entered.
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Motions to remand and responses thereto shall be governed by Rules
4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of these Rules.
(e) When an order to show cause why an action or actions should
not be remanded is entered pursuant to paragraph (iii) of Rule 15(c),
any party may file a response and accompanying brief within fifteen
days of the filing of said order unless otherwise provided for in the order.
Within five days of receipt of a party's response or brief, any party may
file a reply brief limited to new matters. Responses and replies shall be
filed and served in conformity with Rules 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of these Rules.
(f) Conditional Remand Orders
(i) When the Panel has been advised by the transferee judge that
pretrial proceedings in the litigation assigned to him are concluded or
that remand of an action or actions is otherwise appropriate, an order
may be entered by the Clerk of the Panel remanding the action or ac-
tions to the transferor court. The Clerk of the Panel shall distribute a
copy of the order to each party to the litigation but, in order to afford
all parties the opportunity to oppose remand, shall not send the order
to the clerk of the transferee court for fifteen days from the entry
thereof.
(ii) Any party opposing the remand shall file a Notice of Opposi-
tion with the Clerk of the Panel within the fifteen-day period. If a
Notice of Opposition is received by the Clerk of the Panel within this
period, the Clerk of the Panel shall not transmit said order to the
clerk of the transferee court until further order of the Panel.
(iii) Within fifteen days of the filing of its Notice of Opposition, the
opposing party shall file and serve on all parties a motion to vacate
the conditional remand order and brief in support thereof. Any party
desiring to respond shall serve and file an answering brief on all
parties within fifteen days after service of said motion to vacate. Un-
less otherwise ordered by the Panel, the Clerk of the Panel shall set
the motion for hearing at the next session of the Panel. Failure to
file and serve a motion and brief shall be deemed a withdrawal of the
opposition and the Clerk of the Panel shall forthwith transmit the
order to the clerk of the transferee court.
(iv) Conditional remand orders do not become effective unless and
until they are filed with the clerk of the transferee court.
(v) Motions to vacate such orders of the Panel and responses there-
to shall be governed by Rules 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of these Rules.
(g) Upon receipt of an order to remand from the Clerk of the Panel,
the parties shall furnish forthwith to the transferee clerk a stipulation
or designation of the contents of the record to be remanded and furnish
the transferee clerk all necessary copies of any pleading or other matter
filed so as to enable the transferee clerk to comply with the order of
remand.
